胡佛研究所近日發文，公開提出西方應開始考慮承認台灣

美國頂尖智庫胡佛研究所近日發文，公開提出西方應開始考慮承認台灣，因爲西方承認北京的戰略條件已消失，而承認台灣將給中國發出強有力的政治信息，台灣不完全是西方的，卻是民主、自由和繁榮的社會，一個可供中國人選擇的替代品，這樣的制度容易被所有的中國人所接受。中國人維持現狀的根本原因是擔心巨大的社會變革導致社會動盪，承認台灣以取代中國共產黨政權，當然不可能期望台灣的某一個政黨能夠統治整個中國，但至少能夠保持整個中國的繁榮和穩定，同時可使美國國內價值觀與國外利益保持一致。

其中两点作者并没有展开来细说，但是非常值得注意。第一是承认台湾后中国采取联邦制。同时提到了香港、新疆（文中用“突厥斯坦的穆斯林”这个术语），他给出的是美利坚合众国的模板。这个结果可能会加速中国的分裂而不是一个完整的联邦，如苏联解体以后的出现多个独立的国家。第二，作者提到了北大西洋公约第五条。这一条规定缔约国任何一个国家受到攻击，等于对所有缔约国进行攻击。如果承认台湾激怒中国政府，从而采取“武统台湾”的行动，如何激活北约第五条，让所有北约国家出兵保护台湾是一个问题。因为台湾不受北约成员国承认，甚至跟只有四分之一的北约成员国有邦交关系。

下面是谷歌翻译，并稍微做了编辑。

原文

Recognize Taiwan

承認台灣

by Seth Cropsey

Friday, May 29, 2020

Image credit: Poster KO 40, Poster collection, Hoover Institution Archives

On 12 May, New Zealand Foreign Affairs Minister Winston Peters stated that his nation will support Taiwan’s inclusion in the World Health Assembly at the organization’s meeting the following week. The Assembly governs the World Health Organization, the international body tasked with fighting pandemics like COVID-19. China has excluded Taiwan from the WHA since 2017, after participating in sessions as an observer since 2009.

圖片來源：海報KO 40，海報收藏，胡佛研究所檔案館

5月12日，新西蘭外交大臣溫斯頓·彼得斯（Winston Peters）表示，新西蘭將在下週的世界衛生大會上支持台灣加入世界衛生大會。大會由世界衛生組織管理，該組織負責與COVID-19等大流行病作鬥爭。自2009年以觀察員身份參加會議後，中國從2017年起將台灣排除在世界衛生大會之外。

Today, Taiwan has conducted one of the world’s most effective COVID-19 containment campaigns, limiting cases to under 500, and deaths to just seven. Taiwan’s experience would be invaluable in fighting the pandemic in other contexts—it has boosted production of PPE and sanitizer by leveraging indigenous private industry and developed a broadly non-invasive tracking system that has isolated exposed individuals. Any balanced evaluation of the facts would result in Taiwanese admission to the WHA to leverage its lessons and apply them globally.

如今，台灣開展了全球最有效的COVID-19遏制運動之一，將病例數限制在500以內，死亡人數僅為7。台灣在與其他情況下抗擊大流行方面的經驗將是無價的-它通過利用本地私營企業提高了個人防護裝備和消毒劑的生產，並開發了廣泛的非侵入式追踪系統，隔離了受感染者。對事實的任何合理評估都將導致台灣加入WHA，以利用其經驗教訓並將其應用於全球。

The complication, of course, is that the Republic of China is a liberal capitalist democracy with a standard of living equivalent to any Western state, whereas the People’s Republic is a tyrannical oligarchy that brutalizes its own citizens and brooks no political dissent. A Taiwan with full access to international institutions and broad global recognition presents an alternative to Maoist totalitarianism, or “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” as current Ruler-cum-Emperor Xi Jinping has rebranded it.

當然，複雜的是，中華民國是一個自由資本主義民主國家，生活水平與任何西方國家都相當，而中華人民共和國是強暴的寡頭政治，殘酷地對待其本國公民，容不下任何政治異議。如果台灣全面加入國際組織並獲得全球廣泛認可，台灣就可以作為毛式極權主義或由於現任統治者兼皇帝習近平改頭換面重塑過的“中國特色社會主義”的替代品。

One should not expect any ruling party in Taipei to replace the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Beijing and govern China as a single political unit. But the Taiwanese model provides a strong argument for a federated system within Chinese territory. Hong Kong could reclaim its semi-autonomous status, with the individual and political liberties Hong Kongers were afforded for nearly a century. Muslims in East Turkestan could live without fear of targeted persecution, organizing their affairs without Beijing’s unsleeping eye and heavy hand. The CCP loses its legitimacy if the Chinese people more broadly realize that an alternative system—neither explicitly Western nor Maoist—could offer them greater freedom than the current model without sacrificing prosperity or stability.

人們不應該期望台北的任何執政黨都能取代北京的中國共產黨，並將中國作為一個單一的政治單位來統治。但是台灣模式為中國領土內的聯邦制提供了有力的論據。香港可以享有半自治的地位，香港人享有近一個世紀的個人和政治自由。東突厥斯坦的穆斯林可以生活而不必擔心遭到有針對性的迫害，而他們的事務無需北京的監視和壓迫就可以處理。如果中國人民更廣泛地認識到，一個既不明顯是西方也不是毛主義的替代體係可以在不犧牲繁榮或穩定的情況下為他們提供比當前模式更大的自由，那麼中共將失去合法性。

Hence the Beijing government’s paranoia about, and antipathy towards Taiwan, and its attempts to isolate it from the international system. Since 2016, the PRC has bribed Taiwan’s formal diplomatic partners down to 15. In Europe, only the Vatican recognizes Taipei over Beijing. In Africa, landlocked Eswatini is Taiwan’s only friend. Paraguay is its only ally in South America—the remaining 12 nations are small Central American states or islands. Taiwan does maintain an “Economic and Cultural Representative Office” in most Western European states, parts of Asia, the U.S., Canada, Mexico, and elsewhere. Nevertheless, 120 states and affiliated territories lack any formal or informal diplomatic contact with Taiwan. Seven EU members, and eight NATO members, do not recognize Taiwan.

因此，北京政府對台灣抱有偏執和反感，並試圖將其與國際體系隔離。自2016年以來，中國用賄賂的手段已將台灣的正式外交夥伴減少至15名。在歐洲，只有梵蒂岡承認台北而不是北京。在非洲，內陸的埃斯瓦蒂尼是台灣唯一的朋友。巴拉圭是其在南美的唯一盟友-其餘12個國家是中美洲的小州或島嶼。台灣確實在大多數西歐國家，亞洲部分地區，美國，加拿大，墨西哥和其他地方設有“經濟和文化代表處”。但是，有120個州和附屬領土與台灣缺乏任何正式或非正式的外交聯繫。七個歐盟成員和八個北約成員不承認台灣。

The latter point asks the question—how can the U.S. invoke NATO’s Article Five in an Asian contingency over Taiwan, a nation with whom over a quarter of NATO members do not have diplomatic relations, and none of which recognize?

後一點提出了一個問題：美國如何在亞洲對台灣的緊急情況中援引北約的第五條？台灣是一個與四分之一以上的北約成員沒有外交關係，而又沒有人承認的國家？

The United States engineered Beijing’s international recognition between 1969 and 1972 because of a specific confluence of strategic circumstances. Henry Kissinger, National Security Advisor at the time, identified increasing friction between China and the Soviet Union that had functionally split the communist bloc in two. By “opening” to China, Kissinger and President Richard Nixon hoped to smooth American extrication from Vietnam and tilt the geopolitical balance in the West’s favor by mitigating the importance of Asian contingencies and truly surrounding Moscow with hostile states. To this end, the U.S. facilitated the PRC’s United Nations recognition in 1971, and ultimately recognized Beijing over Taipei in 1979.

由於戰略環境的特殊融合，美國促使北京在1969年至1972年獲得國際認可。當時的國家安全顧問亨利·基辛格（Henry Kissinger）發現，中蘇聯之間的摩擦日益加劇，這使共產主義集團在功能上一分為二。通過“開放”中國，基辛格和總統理查德·尼克松希望減輕亞洲突發事件的重要性，並真正將莫斯科與敵對國家包圍，從而使美國從越南擺脫困境，並使地緣政治平衡有利於西方。為此，美國在1971年推動了中華人民共和國在聯合國的席位，並最終在1979年承認了北京並放棄了台灣。

The Sino-American strategic partnership did facilitate American goals throughout the 1980s. President Reagan’s military buildup pressured the Soviet Union on multiple fronts, while a tacit Sino-American entente exposed the USSR’s Asian flanks and cut it off from its greatest potential ally. But by 1989—even before the Berlin Wall fell—it became apparent that the Soviet Union was nearing collapse. Nevertheless, Western policymakers denied the Beijing regime’s ruthlessness even after the “moderate” Deng Xiaoping murdered 3,000 pro-democracy protestors, many of them students, at Tiananmen Square. A broad bipartisan and transatlantic hope developed that integrating China into international economic institutions and increasing trade ties would prompt market reforms, which in turn would drive social and political liberalization and democratization. In a postmodern age, financial wizardry and commercial attraction would transform an erstwhile international pariah into a liberal member of the global capitalist supply chain.

中美戰略夥伴關係確實在整個1980年代實現了美國的目標。雷根總統的軍事集結在多個方面向蘇聯施加了壓力，而一個默契的中美協約國暴露了蘇聯的亞洲側翼，並使其脫離了其最大的潛在盟友。但是到1989年，甚至在柏林牆倒塌之前，蘇聯就已接近崩潰。儘管如此，即使在“溫和的”鄧小平在天安門廣場謀殺了3,000名民主運動示威者（其中許多是學生）之後，西方政策制定者仍否認北京政權的殘酷行為。兩黨和跨大西洋人士寄予了廣泛的希望，那就是將中國納入國際經濟體制並加強貿易聯繫將促進市場改革，從而推動社會和政治自由化與民主化。在後現代時代，金融巫術和商業吸引力將使以前的國際流氓變成全球資本主義供應鏈的自由成員。

Hope is a questionable foundation for foreign policy. This proposition was incorrect in every respect. The CCP has neither liberalized nor democratized, instead obfuscating its control of nominally private entities, creating a robust surveillance system backed by a 1.5-million strong internal army, and conducting a military buildup reminiscent of the 20th-century’s fascist and imperialist powers that caused the greatest loss of life in human history.

希望是外交政策可疑的基礎。這個主張在各個方面都是錯誤的。中共既未實現自由化也未實現民主化，反而模糊了對名義上的私人實體的控制，建立了一支擁有150萬軍隊支持的強大內部監視系統，並進行了使人聯想起20世紀導致人類歷史上最大的生命損失的法西斯和帝國主義力量的軍事集結。

The strategic conditions that validated the West’s recognition of Beijing have evaporated. The CCP shows no intention of “triangulating” against Russia—and while Moscow likely fears Beijing’s ambitions, it has been content to nibble upon Europe’s carcass. COVID-19 has demonstrated the Beijing regime’s duplicity and malice. No government of this sort deserves American recognition, let alone a controlling stake in major international economic, public health, and political institutions.

確認西方承認北京的戰略條件已經消失。儘管莫斯科可能擔心北京的野心，中共也無意對俄羅斯進行“三角鼎力”，而是滿足於蠶食歐洲的屍體。 COVID-19證明了北京政權的雙重性和惡意。這種政府不值得美國的認可，更不用說在主要國際經濟，公共衛生和政治機構中擁有控制權了。

The United States would send a strong international message by moving to recognize Taiwan. This decision will enrage the CCP. But by recognizing and legitimizing an autonomous or independent Taiwan, the U.S. can bolster Taiwan’s clearly anti-Beijing Pan-Green Coalition, while encouraging their political opposition, the Pan-Blue coalition, to re-examine its hopes of accommodation with the PRC. Moreover, by making various forms of economic and political assistance contingent upon certain standards—perhaps the establishment of unofficial relations with the Republic of China, or in certain circumstances formal diplomatic recognition—the U.S. can begin to curb Beijing’s international network of client-colonies.

美國將通過承認台灣來發出強烈的國際信息。這一決定將激怒中共。但是，通過承認和合法化一個自治或獨立的台灣，美國可以支持台灣的反北京泛綠色聯盟，同時鼓勵其政治反對派泛藍色聯盟重新考慮其與中國和解的希望。此外，通過使各種形式的經濟和政治援助增加某些必要的附帶標準（也許與中華民國建立非正式關係，或在某些情況下獲得正式的外交承認），美國可以開始遏制北京的國際附庸殖民地網絡。

Rhetorically, however, recognition of Taiwan would send a powerful political message. The past forty years of American—and Western—China policy has failed. The Beijing regime is no more tolerable in 2020 than it was in 1950, or 1989: it is, however, far richer as it continues to build a military equal to its global ambition. Taiwan is democratic, prosperous, and free. Not all nations are equal, despite the pretentions of the UN General Assembly. Recognizing Taiwan presents a rare opportunity to align American values at home and interests abroad.

但是，從言辭上講，承認台灣將發出強有力的政治信息。過去40年的美國和西方對華政策均告失敗。到2020年，北京政權的容忍度不會比1950年或1989年的容忍度高：但是，由於北京繼續建立與其全球野心相等的軍事力量，北京的政權更加富裕。台灣是民主，繁榮和自由的。儘管有聯合國大會的要求，但並非所有國家都是平等的。承認台灣是一個難得的機會，可以使美國在國內的價值觀與國外的利益保持一致。

Seth Cropsey is a senior fellow at Hudson Institute and director of Hudson’s Center for American Seapower. He served as a naval officer and as deputy Undersecretary of the Navy in the Reagan and George H. W. Bush administrations.

塞思·克羅普塞（Seth Cropsey）是哈德遜學院（Hudson Institute）的高級研究員，也是哈德森美國海上力量中心的主任。他曾在裡根政府和喬治·H·W·布什政府任海軍軍官和海軍副部長。